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Southeast Asia will likely be the epicenter of the next 
infl uenza pandemic. To determine whether health system 
resources in Thailand are suffi cient to contain an emerg-
ing pandemic, we mapped health system resources in 76 
provinces. We used 3 prepandemic scenarios of clustered 
cases and determined resource needs, availability, and 
gaps. We extended this analysis to a scenario of a modest 
pandemic and assumed that the same standards of clinical 
care would be required. We found that gaps exist in many 
resource categories, even under scenarios in which few 
cases occur. Such gaps are likely to be profound if a se-
vere pandemic occurs. These gaps exist in infrastructure, 
personnel and materials, and surveillance capacity. Policy 
makers must determine whether such resource gaps can 
realistically be closed, ideally before a pandemic occurs. 
Alternatively, explicit assumptions must be made regarding 
allocation of scarce resources, standards of care, and prior-
ity setting during a pandemic.
The World Health Organization (WHO) has highlighted how the Asia-Pacifi c region has been an important cen-
ter of emerging diseases such as severe acute respiratory 
syndrome (SARS) and avian infl uenza. Since 2003 (as of 
September 10, 2008), 15 countries have experienced human 
cases of infection with infl uenza virus A subtype H5N1 (1), 
and subtype H5N1 infection is now endemic in poultry in 
several countries. The H5N1 subtype continues to pose an 
important public health threat in both the short term and 
the long term. Southeast Asia remains a likely region from 
which future emerging infectious diseases, including the 
next infl uenza pandemic, are likely to emerge (2,3).
In a resolution issued in April 2005, WHO expressed 
concern about the general lack of global preparedness for 
pandemic infl uenza (4). Since then, considerable interna-
tional efforts have been expended, and substantial resourc-
es have been committed to controlling avian infl uenza and 
preparing for pandemic infl uenza (5). Because the question 
is not whether a pandemic will occur but rather when (6), 
policy makers have been urged to take action in prepared-
ness planning, including making national preparedness 
strategies operational (5,7,8). However, despite efforts to 
support preparedness, no universally accepted, organized 
method of evaluating preparedness exists, and concerns 
have been raised that implementation of many national stra-
tegic plans may be unrealistic (9,10). Several approaches 
have been adopted to evaluate preparedness, including as-
sessments of national strategic plans (9,11), desk-top simu-
lations (12), full-scale fi eld exercises, case studies with site 
visits to assess health systems (8), and mathematical mod-
eling exercises (13,14). All have particular strengths and 
weaknesses. Most of these approaches, although linked to 
national strategic and operational plans, have not included 
assessments of capacity to respond (that is, of available 
resources at each site and the potential to mobilize these 
resources). Without determining capacity to respond, the 
feasibility of effectively and effi ciently implementing plans 
in a time of crisis remains highly uncertain.
In this article, we defi ne and quantify, at the province 
level, the health system resources likely to be drawn upon 
in the event of WHO prepandemic phases 4 and 5 in Thai-
land, a relatively well-developed, middle-income, South-
east Asian country at high risk for being the epicenter of 
the next pandemic. We estimate gaps in resources, given 
several prepandemic infl uenza scenarios. These scenarios 
were previously developed by policy makers and have been 
used extensively in tabletop exercises in most provinces 
throughout the country. Our aim was to determine the chal-
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lenges still remaining in preparing the country to effective-
ly meet and contain the danger of an emergent pandemic. 
We addressed the challenge of mitigation in the event of a 
modest pandemic scenario, but, in agreement with national 
strategic policy, we assumed no diminution of standards of 
care or rationing of clinical services. Although the ability 
to maintain such levels of care is unlikely in reality, no na-
tional policies explicitly acknowledge this possibility; thus, 
this research draws on scenarios and assumptions currently 
guiding policy making.
Methods
Resource Mapping
The health system in Thailand is organized through 
12 health regions. These regions include 76 provinces (in 
this article, we consider Bangkok a province). The prov-
inces comprise 784 administrative districts; Bangkok has 
an additional 50 administrative districts. We mapped the 
presence of resources across Thailand’s provinces. We de-
veloped a survey instrument to determine resources likely 
to be drawn upon at the province level if human-to-human 
spread of a novel infl uenza virus occurs. The survey in-
strument was developed in a stepwise manner. First, we 
reviewed the case notes about all human cases of avian 
infl uenza that have occurred in Thailand since 2004 and 
determined the resources used to manage the cases. Sec-
ond, we conducted a literature review of resources used 
in managing infl uenza and SARS, and we then expanded 
the list of resources determined from the case notes review 
list. Third, we reviewed the resource list with experts in 
communicable disease control at national institutions and, 
through these discussions, modifi ed the list.
A survey instrument was developed from the resource 
list and pilot tested in Kanchanaburi Province among 
healthcare personnel from several public health and health-
care institutions at the local, district, and province levels. 
Minor modifi cations and clarifi cations were made to the 
survey instrument as a result.
The survey instrument addressed resource needs 
across 4 topics of interest: surveillance, case investigation, 
case treatment, and prevention of spread of disease in the 
community. Thirty-nine resources were assessed. Data on 
infrastructure, personnel, and materials were collected. 
Province data sources were derived from the following in-
stitutional settings, which were identifi ed through national 
routine health system data sources: district hospitals; sub-
district health centers; district public health offi ces; region-
al, provincial, and higher level health institutions; private 
healthcare facilities; and university healthcare facilities.
The survey instrument was sent to representatives of 
each of the 75 provinces and Bangkok in July 2007. These 
province representatives sent questionnaires to institutions 
at lower organizational levels. Duplication of data was 
avoided by coordinating data collection through designated 
institutional respondents. Those who did not respond were 
reminded by letter and phone calls 2 months after they had 
received the questionnaires.
Scenarios
Building on simulation exercises conducted in Thai-
land and on transmission dynamics in the published lit-
erature, we assumed 3 scenarios (14). The scenarios were 
previously developed by Thailand’s Department of Dis-
ease Control and made explicit assumptions about attack 
rates, illness, and mortality rates (15,16). As of July 2007, 
66 (88%) provinces and 468 (60%) districts had conducted 
tabletop exercises that drew on these scenarios. Of note, 
these scenarios were static; that is, cases and contacts (i.e., 
opportunities for spread) occurred simultaneously. We as-
sumed that the current policy focus in Thailand is on con-
tainment, rather than on mitigation. Our interest was in 
determining the resource gaps in WHO phases 4 and 5 (lo-
calized and substantial clusters, respectively). We did not 
analyze the processes of mobilizing resources or the associ-
ated logistical challenges.
Scenario 1, WHO Phase 4
This scenario assumed human-to-human transmission 
from case-patients to caregivers. It involved 2 patients with 
confi rmed infl uenza, 3 health personnel with confi rmed 
mild infl uenza, and 10 persons who were close contacts of 
the patients.
Scenario 2, WHO Phase 5
This scenario assumed human-to-human transmission 
in localized clusters. It involved 5 patients with confi rmed 
infl uenza and 75 contact persons.
Scenario 3, WHO Phase 5
This scenario assumed human-to-human transmission 
that resulted in a substantial number of cases. One cluster 
of human-to-human infl uenza cases was identifi ed in each 
of 5 districts of the province. Each cluster consisted of 5 pa-
tients with confi rmed infl uenza (25 in total) and 375 contact 
persons across the province.
Resource Needs
We determined resource needs at the province level 
for each of the 3 above-mentioned scenarios. Resource 
needs were determined through retrospective analyses of 
case notes and discussions with clinicians and surveillance 
personnel intimately involved in managing earlier cases of 
avian infl uenza in persons in Thailand. For case-patients 
and their contacts, infrastructural, personnel, and mate-
rial needs were determined. Thus, for the outbreaks, we 
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assumed that needs were the resources used, multiplied 
by the number of case-patients or by the total number of 
contacts of the case-patients and the contacts generated 
respectively through different scenarios. We assumed that 
resource needs for any case-patient would be the same as 
for subsequent case-patients (that is, that resource needs are 
linearly related to the numbers of case-patients and their 
contacts as an outbreak develops).
Province Resource Gaps
We determined resource gaps at the province level 
for each scenario and defi ned infl uenza-specifi c resources. 
Some resources such as oseltamivir are used specifi cally 
for treatment of infl uenza. We assumed, therefore, that 
some resources were dedicated infl uenza resources. For 
oseltamivir use, we assumed that case-patients would re-
ceive treatment and that their contacts would be given pro-
phylaxis. Other resources were nonspecifi c for infl uenza. 
For example, physicians would still be needed to provide 
essential healthcare services. We assumed, on the basis of 
other reports (17,18), that because resources would still be 
demanded by essential health services, 12% of non–infl u-
enza-dedicated resources would be available to support in-
fl uenza control. That is, 88% of resources would still be 
dedicated to essential services. We assumed that available 
beds in negative-pressure rooms would be needed fi rst, 
then isolation beds, then single-occupancy rooms, and so 
forth. We assumed that care for case-patients would be 
provided in hospitals and that care for contacts would be 
provided in the community. Some resources, such as hospi-
tal beds, cannot be shared between provinces. We assumed 
that other resources would not be shared between provinces 
in a timely manner (an unpublished qualitative analysis of 
the mobilization of resources showed that mobilization of 
resources through formal agreements is ill defi ned and has 
been diffi cult to achieve during simulation exercises; P. 
Chompook, unpub. data).
Dynamic Timeline Analysis
Although scenarios used in tabletop simulation exercis-
es across Thailand to date have been static, in reality, WHO 
phases 4 and 5 are likely to emerge over several days and 
weeks. In a secondary analysis, we determined the needs and 
gaps for resources if we assumed that cases would emerge 
in a manner predicted by published transmission dynamics 
scenarios (19). We assumed that case-patients would need 
to be hospitalized for 7 days and that treatment with antivi-
ral drugs would be provided to case-patients and contacts in 
accordance with recommendations (20).
National Resource Gaps under WHO Phase 6
National strategic policy regarding pandemic infl uenza 
makes no explicit acknowledgment that standards of care 
will decrease or that allocation of scarce resources will, of 
necessity, demand rationing. We determined national gaps 
in resources under mild pandemic conditions by assuming 
that scenario 3 would develop evenly and simultaneously 
across all provinces (that is, early pandemic WHO phase 
6). We fi rst assumed perfect mobilization of resources such 
that provinces with excess resource capacity effectively 
and effi ciently supported provinces with gaps. Resource 
gaps described under this scenario were determined by the 
summation of surplus and gaps in resources from all prov-
inces. Also, under the same WHO phase 6 scenario, we 
assumed inadequate (imperfect) mobilization of resources 
across provincial borders such that resources remained 
within provinces. Resource gaps under this scenario were 
derived from the summation of gaps only from provinces 
where estimated resource shortfalls occur.
Results
Data were collected from respondents at the region, 
province, and district levels. Data from 73 (96%) provinces 
were made available through respondents in 765 districts 
(765/834, 92%). Full data from all province institutions 
were provided from 53 (70%) provinces. Data from Bang-
kok were provided solely by public hospitals.
To determine total availability of provincial and na-
tional resources and account for missing data, we estimated 
the resource availability in districts where data were un-
available and extrapolated these estimations. We assumed 
that districts with similar numbers of hospital beds would 
have the same quantity of other resources available. The 
Ministry of Health determines bed quotas, and data were 
derived from routine data sources.
The average quantity of province resources is listed 
in Table 1. The estimated average province resources are 
the result of extrapolation and correction when data points 
were missing. Because few data points were missing, the 
estimates were very similar to the averages derived from 
hard data. The estimated resources were further analyzed to 
determine resource gaps. Substantial differences in resource 
availability exist across provinces. We found no correlation 
of resources with gross provincial product (a measure of a 
province’s economic well-being) or with province poultry 
density. We found, however, correlations between some re-
sources (for example, healthcare personnel, hospital beds, 
and ventilator equipment) and both population size and 
density (Table 1).
The differences in resource availability across provinc-
es are illustrated through 7 selected resources (Figures 1, 2). 
These selected resources offer insights into the geographic 
variations in preparedness in relation to surveillance capac-
ity (surveillance and rapid response team [SRRT] person-
nel), case investigation capacity (SRRT, internal medicine 
doctors), case-patient treatment capacity (oseltamivir treat-
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ment courses, respirators, critical care nurses), and capacity 
to prevent spread of disease in the community (negative-
pressure rooms, isolation rooms, surgical masks).
Gaps in resources existed in some provinces under 
scenario 1 (and thus for subsequent scenarios). These 
resource gaps include infrastructure, personnel, and ma-
terials and potentially limit capacity in all 4 control ar-
eas (surveillance capacity, case-investigation capacity, 
case-treatment capacity, and capacity to prevent spread 
of disease in the community) (online Technical Appen-
dix, available from www.cdc.gov/EID/content/15/3/423-
Techapp.pdf). If care for case-patients is limited to nega-
tive-pressure rooms or isolation beds, then bed availability 
is likely to be problematic, even with a small numbers of 
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Table 1. Average available resources and estimated average resources needed for pandemic influenza control at province level and
correlation of selected province data with province resources, 76 provinces, Thailand* 
Correlation with province resources 
Selected resources 
Province resources 
available† (range) 
Province
resources 
needed† Population
Population
density GPP
Poultry 
density 
Hospitals‡ 14 (3–36) 15 0.129 ?0.113 0.008 0.531
Health centers§ 133 (21–403) 143 0.327 ?0.270 ?0.143 0.511
Infrastructure (no. beds)
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed) 13 (1–38) 13 0.482 ?0.006 ?0.096 0.331
 Isolation beds 9 (1–117) 9 0.725¶ 0.812 0.261 ?0.045
 Single-occupancy room beds 158 (24–2,942) 158 0.785 0.880 0.206 ?0.029
 ICU beds 37 (4–605) 37 0.817 0.842 0.172 ?0.044
 General medicine beds 134 (6–1,301) 134 0.818 0.833 0.180 ?0.004
 Other beds (OB/GYN, surgical, etc.) 1,066 (90–4,377) 1,184 0.763 0.575 0.160 0.190
 Child beds 80 (21–814) 80 0.848 0.832 0.187 ?0.047
Personnel
 SRRT personnel 202 (50–604) 223 0.580 ?0.013 ?0.100 0.325
 Internal medicine doctors 43 (1–670) 44 0.817 0.834 0.180 0.005
 Pediatricians 25 (1–336) 25 0.828 0.841 0.216 0.021
 Radiologists 6 (0–117) 6 0.805 0.791 0.159 ?0.010
 Pathologists 9 (0–111) 9 0.617 0.571 0.114 0.331
 Other physicians# 241 (32–2,229) 251 0.806 0.791 0.160 0.004
 Critical care nurses 34 (0–535) 34 0.766 0.833 0.202 0.024
 General nurses 1,219 (176–9,831) 1,284 0.919 0.832 0.187 0.091
 Health officer in health center§ 322 (72–977) 345 0.363 ?0.265 ?0.209 0.444
 Village health volunteer§ 10,424 (1,500–49,597) 11,006 0.442 ?0.218 ?0.296 0.411
Materials
 Ambulances 25 (8–79) 28 0.619 0.235 0.091 0.333
 Patient transportation vehicles 96 (24–324) 104 0.521 ?0.019 ?0.123 0.259
 Portable radiography machine 10 (3–100) 11 0.599 0.547 0.147 0.064
 Adult (Bird’s and volume) respirator 90 (8–1,076) 96 0.850 0.803 0.228 0.082
 Children’s volume respirator 24 (0–212) 25 0.596 0.514 0.175 0.165
 Vital sign machine 280 (14–1,723) 302 0.560 0.250 ?0.037 0.182
 Oximeter 70 (4–813) 74 0.810 0.770 0.132 0.025
 Disposable gowns 1,328 (93–17,249) 1,377 0.737 0.717 0.181 0.054
 N95 masks 6,681 (1,247–27,721) 7,181 0.517 0.304 0.021 0.108
 Surgical masks 16,031 (673–211,411) 16,440 0.349 0.472 ?0.013 ?0.080
 Plastic face shields 541 (52–4,366) 567 0.349 0.092 ?0.046 0.005
 Goggles 919 (204–6,220) 961 0.643 0.550 0.199 0.044
 Surgical gloves 64,757 (605–731,117) 66,201 0.583 0.456 ?0.015 0.118
 Surgical hats 9,558 (390–234,955) 9,861 0.843 0.865 0.178 0.100
 Rapid test kit for influenza 544 (62–3,005) 576 0.366 0.267 ?0.021 0.111
 Swab bags 630 (0–10,901) 669 0.228 ?0.028 ?0.021 ?0.001
 Oseltamivir tablets 14,525 (1,290–60,110) 14,854 0.175 0.065 0.028 ?0.072
 Viral transport media 231 (35–818) 249 0.539 0.283 ?0.014 0.159
 Body bags 129 (0–1,050) 145 0.432 0.551 0.138 0.097
 Lime (10-kg bags) 67 (0–1,008) 71 0.225 ?0.051 ?0.048 0.048
 Chlorine (50-kg bags) 211 (0–10,121) 206 ?0.071 0.079 0.067 ?0.065
 Sodium hypochlorite (1 L) 1,570 (0–50,190) 1,540 0.061 0.085 0.223 0.048
*GPP, gross provincial product; SRRT, surveillance and rapid response team; ICU, intensive care unit; OB/GYN, obstetricians/gynecologists. Data 
sources: Population and population density data are from the Department of Provincial Administration, 2007; GPP is from 2005 data from the National 
Economic and Social Development Board; poultry density was determined from the number of chickens and ducks in each province in 2006 from the 
Information and Statistics Group, Information Technology Centre, Department of Livestock Development, Bangkok, Thailand. 
†Average. Missing district-level data are estimated. 
‡Excludes private hospitals in Bangkok. 
§Excludes data from Bangkok. 
¶Boldface indicates that correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
#General practitioners, surgeons, OB/GYN, etc. 
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cases. However, if beds dedicated to wider use are made 
available, then shortfalls are unlikely when limited cases 
occur. Most resource gaps are linked to critical care and 
include lack of trained personnel and respirators. For ex-
ample, by scenario 3, 92% of provinces will have insuf-
fi cient negative-pressure rooms to respond effectively to 
case-patients, and a severe shortage of critical care nurses 
will occur. However, if isolation beds are used, the pro-
portion of provinces with insuffi cient resources falls to 
≈75%, and if single occupancy rooms are also used, bed 
capacity across the country is suffi cient. As the number 
of case-patients and contacts increases through scenarios 
2 and 3, the number of provinces with gaps in resources 
grows. The geographic distribution of resource gaps var-
ies, depending on resource and scenario (Figures 3–5; on-
line Technical Appendix).
The need for 4 selected resources changed over time, 
assuming the epidemic curve has the usual shape (Figure 
6). The gap in available resources was limited to only a 
few days for respiratory support. For beds, likewise, when 
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Figure 1. Density of selected health system resources available for pandemic infl uenza across provinces, Thailand. A) Surveillance and 
rapid response team personnel; B) internal medicine physicians; C) critical care nurses.
Figure 2. Density of selected health system resources available for pandemic infl uenza across provinces, Thailand. A) Negative-pressure 
rooms; B) adult respirators; C) surgical masks; D) oseltamivir tablets.
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small numbers of cases occur and case-patients are cared 
for in negative-pressure rooms or isolation rooms, short-
ages are likely to arise for only a few days. Suffi cient stocks 
of oseltamivir are currently held at the provincial level to 
meet the needs of a few case-patients and their contacts.
Resource gaps exist on the national level if scenario 
3 occurs simultaneously in all provinces across Thailand 
(Table 2). Such an event represents WHO phase 6, that 
is, sustained human-to-human transmission, albeit on a 
relatively small scale. Despite this small scale, national 
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Figure 3. Gaps in health system resources (internal medicine physicians) likely to occur for 3 scenarios of prepandemic infl uenza across 
provinces, Thailand. A) Scenario 1; B) scenario 2; C) scenario 3.
Figure 4. Gaps in health system resources (adult respirators) likely to occur for 3 scenarios of prepandemic infl uenza across provinces, 
Thailand. A) Scenario 1; B) scenario 2; C) scenario 3.
Capacity to Contain Infl uenza Pandemic, Thailand
resource gaps are substantial if the same standard of clini-
cal care is maintained when fewer cases arise. For some 
critical resources, such as internal medicine physicians and 
oseltamivir tablets, the problem is mitigated if we assume 
perfectly effective, timely, and effi cient movement of re-
sources from provinces with surplus capacity to provinces 
with gaps. Some resources, however, are limited in number 
(such as critical care nurses), and even effective redistribu-
tion may make little difference in outcome.
Discussion
We showed that Thailand is likely to have some re-
source gaps in responding to clusters of cases in an emer-
gent infl uenza pandemic and that these gaps vary across 
different provinces. These gaps are, however, likely to oc-
cur over a limited duration if the cases occur over several 
weeks and the numbers of cases are limited. As the num-
ber of cases increases, however, provincial and national 
capacity is likely to be tested in certain ways if clinical 
care and surveillance are expected to remain at a similar 
standard as when cases are limited. The results of such a 
scenario are similar for some countries of western Europe 
(21). Although policy makers will, in all likelihood, need 
to consider issues of rationing and priority setting explic-
itly in national strategic planning, resources in Thailand 
are substantial overall, although geographic distribution 
likely poses logistical challenges. In the event of a mod-
est outbreak of pandemic infl uenza (WHO phase 6) similar 
to these locally developed scenarios, Thailand, a relatively 
affl uent country in Southeast Asia, might encounter rela-
tively modest gaps in available resources. However, if a 
pandemic is substantial in terms of the severity of illness 
and proportion of deaths, resources are likely to be insuf-
fi cient, and policy makers will have to consider whether 
such resource gaps can be closed in reality. This conclu-
sion has important policy implications and raises several 
questions. Should most resources and planning be focused 
explicitly on early containment potentially at the expense 
of mitigation, particularly in developing countries? How, 
to whom, and where should the deployment of scarce re-
sources be planned (22)? A further issue raised is how real-
istic simulation exercises are and whether they effectively 
inform preparedness planning. Investment to address gaps 
in resources can be focused where the most important gaps 
exist. Some gaps, however, for example, in clinical and 
nursing staff, will take time and considerable investment 
to fi ll. We show at the province level where resource gaps 
are most profound and thus where future investment might 
be focused.
The variations of resources correlate strongly with 
both the population size and the population density of a 
province. Historically, healthcare resources have been dis-
tributed on the basis of provincial population size and not 
according to poverty indices. To date, risk assessments re-
lated to pandemic infl uenza have not informed planning and 
deployment of resources. This circumstance has potentially 
important implications for future preparedness planning. 
Provinces with relatively less dense populations, in which 
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Figure 5. Gaps in health system resources (oseltamivir tablets) likely to occur for 3 scenarios of prepandemic infl uenza across provinces, 
Thailand. A) Scenario 1; B) scenario 2; C) scenario 3.
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communication facilities are stretched to their limit and ac-
cess to services is already likely to be problematic, may be 
further challenged by their relatively fewer resources (23). 
Focused investment in resources may be needed if the re-
sponse to an emergent pandemic is to be equitable. Varia-
tions exist also among provinces in their resource capacity 
for surveillance, case investigation, case-patient treatment, 
and control of community spread.
Responding effectively and in a timely manner to 
gaps we have highlighted will be a managerial challenge. 
Moreover, using available resources most effectively and 
effi ciently on a national scale also demands considerable 
managerial and administrative capacity (issues we did not 
examine). The timely mobilization of most resources re-
mains to be planned.
This study has several limitations. First, our survey 
focused on the narrow clinical response and ignored the 
capacity of management, administrative systems, fi nancial 
systems, and communications, capacities that are likely to 
be needed to effi ciently mobilize resources (24). Second, 
we assumed that the relationship between resource need 
and case-patients is linear, and we estimated gaps on the 
basis of assumptions that care for case-patients as the pan-
demic unfolds will draw upon similarly characterized re-
sources as in earlier phases. This assumed relationship is 
unlikely to occur, and care for case-patients is likely to be 
different from our study assumptions. However, few stra-
tegic plans explicitly acknowledge this change in resource 
use and thus do not plan for it (9). Third, our scenarios, 
although based on tabletop exercises conducted across the 
country, are limited in terms of anticipated case-patients 
and their contacts. Even though we extended our scenar-
io to a modest pandemic, an alternative real-life scenario 
under which large numbers of cases occur is likely to test 
the health system profoundly. Fourth, we assumed that re-
source sharing between provinces would be limited on the 
basis of an analysis of formal strategic arrangements. Fifth, 
some data points were missing. Although the missing data 
were few, and corrections were possible, some of these data 
were from Bangkok. In Bangkok, any determination of the 
city’s overall resources is a challenge because of the many 
private autonomous healthcare facilities and their lack of 
systematic integration into the public health system. This 
factor means that our interpretation of Bangkok’s capacity 
to respond should be considered with caution. Bangkok has 
65 private hospitals with >50 beds (14,000 beds in total), 
and these institutions were excluded from our survey. The 
challenge of coordinating the city’s resources in the event 
of a pandemic is substantial. Without an understanding of 
what and where those resources are, their management will 
be much more challenging. This lack of knowledge would 
have profound implications for Thailand because Bangkok 
is a city of 10 million persons, the economic powerhouse 
of the country, and a hub for transportation and communi-
cations with the rest of Thailand. The missing information 
also has important implications for the global control of a 
pandemic because of Bangkok’s role as a major interna-
tional transport hub. If emergent pandemic infl uenza can-
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Figure 6. Projected demand and gaps in selected health system resources in Thailand, assuming prepandemic containment. A) Hospital 
beds; B) critical care nurses; C) adult respirators; D) oseltamivir tablets.
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not be controlled in Bangkok, the world will be affected. 
The same lack of complete information would apply to 
other major cities where complex health systems exist.
We have shown that the health system resources avail-
able to Thailand are likely to be suffi cient to respond to 
emergent pandemic infl uenza if the pandemic is modest 
and occurs in a manner similar to the assumptions inform-
ing Thailand’s simulation exercises. Other countries in the 
region, which is acknowledged to be at high risk for being 
at the epicenter of the next global pandemic of infl uenza 
(25), are likely to have fewer resources than Thailand (3). 
We are currently investigating the capacity of Thailand 
and neighboring countries to respond to more profound 
pandemic infl uenza scenarios. Policy makers in the region 
may need to refl ect on where health system resources in 
the region might best be positioned and further expanded; 
what scenario assumptions are used to inform prepared-
ness planning; whether containment, mitigation, or both, 
should be the focus of attention; and whether provinces 
with the largest probable gaps should be supported further 
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Table 2. National resource gaps for pandemic influenza control if perfect mobilization and imperfect mobilization in WHO phase 6,
assuming scenario 3 occurs simultaneously in all provinces, Thailand* 
National gaps 
Selected resources 
Assuming perfect 
mobilization
Assuming imperfect 
mobilization
Infrastructure (beds), assuming care limited to these 
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed)  ?1,015 ?1,052
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed) + isolation beds ?225 ?517
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed) + Isolation beds + single-occupancy room beds 0 0
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed) + isolation beds + single-occupancy room beds  
 + ICU beds  
0 0
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed) + Isolation beds + single-occupancy room beds  
 + ICU beds + general medicine beds
0 0
 Negative-pressure rooms (single bed) + Isolation beds + single-occupancy room beds  
 + ICU beds + general medicine beds + other beds (OB/GYN, surgical, etc.)  
0 0
 Children’s beds NA NA
Personnel
 SRRT personnel 0 0
 Internal medicine physicians ?40 ?195
 Pediatricians NA NA
 Radiologists 0 ?5
 Pathologists 0 ?9
 Other physicians (general practitioners, surgeons, OB/GYN, etc.) 0 0
 Critical care nurses ?1,640 ?1,679
 General nurses 0 0
 Health officer in health center† 0 0
 Village health volunteers† 0 0
Materials
 Ambulances 0 0
 Patient transportation vehicles 0 0
 Portable radiography machines 0 0
 Adult (Bird’s and volume) respirator ?1,023 ?1,166
 Children’s volume respirator NA NA
 Vital sign machine 0 ?365
 Oximeter ?1,221 ?1,317
 Disposable gowns ?16,6041 ?166,041
 N95 masks 
 Surgical masks ?59,063 ?120,186
 Plastic face shields 0 ?668
 Goggles 0 0
 Surgical gloves 0 ?39,242
 Surgical hats ?88,665 ?119,239
 Rapid test kit for influenza 0 0
 Swab bags 0 ?59
 Oseltamivir tablets 0 ?3,717
 Viral transport media 0 0
 Body bags 0 ?373
 Lime (10-kg bags) 0 ?716
 Chlorine (50-kg bags) 0 ?18
 Sodium hypochlorite (1 L) 0 ?216
*WHO, World Health Organization; ICU, intensive care unit; OB/GYN, obstetricians/gynecologists; SRRT, surveillance and rapid response; NA, not 
applicable: no child cases in 3 scenarios. 0 means that there was no shortfall in the resource item. Scenario 3 assumed human-to-human transmission 
resulting in a substantial number of cases. 
†Excludes data from Bangkok. 
RESEARCH
in strengthening response capacity. Policy makers should 
also consider how the capacity of the private healthcare 
sector can, if a public health crisis occurs, be drawn upon 
in a timely and effective manner. In the event of a major 
pandemic, diffi cult decisions regarding the use of scarce 
resources will need to be made, and explicit planning ahead 
for the pandemic is advised.
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